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Presidents, Assembly Dissolution and the Electoral Performance 




Many European presidents have extensive constitutional powers to affect the timing of early 
parliamentary elections, which enables them to influence when incumbent governments must 
face the electorate. This paper examines whether presidents use their assembly dissolution 
powers for partisan benefit. To date, presidential activism in the electoral arena of 
parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies remains poorly understood. We hypothesize 
that presidents use their powers to influence election calling for the advantage of their 
political allies in government. To test this argument, we use data on 190 elections in eighteen 
European democracies. Our results suggest that presidents with significant dissolution powers 
are able to shape the electoral success of incumbents. Prime ministers whose governments are 
allied to such presidents realize a vote and seat share bonus of around five per cent. These 
findings have implications for our understanding of presidential activism, strategic 
parliamentary dissolution and electoral accountability. 
 
The overwhelming majority of Europe’s presidential heads of state, both popularly and 
indirectly elected, have some influence on the timing of parliamentary elections (Strøm & 
Swindle, 2002).1 They may have a role in initiating or advancing the process of parliamentary 
dissolution and most presidents are empowered to take the ultimate decision to dissolve. Can 
such presidents use their powers to promote the electoral fortunes of governments that they 
support? Politicians, journalists, and the public commonly believe that a well-timed election, 
                                               
1
 European constitutions grant both popularly and indirectly elected presidents powers to 
influence parliamentary dissolution and we examine how both types of presidents employ 
their powers. A debate focuses on the question whether direct election gives presidents 
greater legitimacy to employ their powers (Duverger, 1980; Tavits, 2009). We reserve 
judgment on this question and control for the method of election in our empirical analysis.  

































































which coincides with circumstances that favor the incumbent, can make a crucial difference 
between a government’s reelection or defeat. If presidents use their influence on election 
calling for partisan advantage, then governments that are allied to the president, i.e., those in 
which the presidential party holds the premiership or is a coalition partner, may face the 
electorate under systematically more favorable conditions than their peers who lack 
presidential support. The political relationship between the government and a president who 
can influence election timing may therefore crucially shape the incumbent’s electoral success.  
 Consider the following examples. In May 1968, the French president de Gaulle called 
an early election, enabling his political allies in government to reassert their authority and 
confront a student rebellion and general strike (Wilson, 1969, p. 551). Strong economic 
growth and the unprecedented political stability, which the French Fifth Republic had 
experienced up to this point (Wilson, 1969: 567), benefitted the Gaullist-led governing 
coalition’s electoral popularity, and both governing parties increased their vote share 
compared to the previous legislative election (Thiebault, 2000, p. 526). As a result, the 
Gaullists weathered the difficult political situation, returned to government and held on to the 
premiership (Thiebault, 2000, pp. 500-501). The choice of Italian president Francesco 
Cossiga to call early elections in 1987 proved equally decisive in shoring up the governing 
coalition, while helping his political allies, the Christian Democrats (DC) to the premiership. 
President Cossiga, a longstanding member of the DC, called the election to end a prolonged 
political crisis that had resulted when the five party coalition government led by the socialist 
PSI under Bettino Craxi with participation of the DC collapsed (Donovan, 1988, pp. 130-131, 
Verzichelli & Cotta, 2000, p. 454). By allowing early elections during a period of strong 
economic growth (Bull, 2015, p. 299), Cossiga achieved two results. The two leading parties 
within the coalition, the PSI and the DC, were able to shore up their electoral dominance at 
the expense of the opposition communist party (PCI) (Verzichelli & Cotta, 2000, p. 491), and 

































































the DC reasserted its leading position as the largest parliamentary party, permitting it to claim 
the premiership (Donovan, 1988, p. 131). These two cases are illustrative of a wider 
empirical pattern documented in the case oriented literature, which suggests that presidents 
pay close attention to electoral prospects of their political allies when they permit or invoke 
parliamentary dissolution (a more extensive discussion is available in SI 1). 
This paper examines whether Europe’s presidential heads of state are able to affect 
the electoral performance of incumbents systematically through their influence on 
parliamentary election timing.2 Previous research suggests that the electoral fortunes of prime 
ministers and governments are centrally shaped by their policy performance, in particular the 
state of the economy (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000; Anderson, 2000; Duch & Stevenson, 
2008). This focus of the literature on performance voting also extends to other policy areas 
(Hobolt et al., 2013, Klašnja et al., 2016), and in semi-presidential democracies, it has even 
been shown to apply when the two parts of the dual executive - government and the 
presidency - are controlled by different parties or party coalitions (Lewis-Beck, 1997; 
Hellwig & Samuels, 2008).3 To the extent that previous research has acknowledged a 
presidential influence on the electoral performance of prime ministers and governments, it 
has focused on presidential coattail effects, i.e., the effect of direct presidential elections on 
                                               
2
 We include parliamentary republics and semi-presidential democracies in our study because 
presidents in both regime types may be endowed with constitutional powers to influence 
parliamentary dissolution and must work with governments dependent on assembly 
confidence in pursuing their political goals. Presidents in both types of democracies may 
therefore have motivations and opportunities to dissolve the legislature for partisan gain.  
3
 Under unified government, i.e., when the president’s party also controls the premiership, 
voters are expected to reward or punish the governing party for its policy performance in all 
national elections (Hellwig & Samuels, 2008, p. 70). 

































































the results that parties achieve in the parliamentary race (Samuels & Shugart 2010, pp. 127-8; 
Golder, 2006; Stoll, 2005). These studies make valuable contributions to our understanding 
of the electoral performance of governments and prime ministers, but they build on the 
shared assumption that the timing of legislative elections is generally exogenously 
determined. In reality, however, presidential heads of state in most European democracies 
have some ability to influence when elections are called. This gives rise to the question 
whether presidents employ this influence for partisan benefit. 
A sizable literature shows that European presidents are political actors who use their 
constitutional powers to pursue policy, office and electoral goals (Duverger, 1980; Shugart & 
Carey, 1992; Elgie, 1999; Strøm & Swindle, 2002; Protsyk, 2005; Tavits, 2009). To 
presidents, a parliamentary dissolution that benefits their political allies can have numerous 
benefits – it may return the presidential party to office, give the president influence on 
ministerial selection and open up opportunities to advance policies that reflect presidential 
preferences (O’Neil, 1993; Millard, 2000; Amorim Neto & Costa Lobo, 2009; van Ooyen, 
2015). Thus, presidents who work in coordination with their political allies in government 
can achieve significant success in implementing their policy goals and building their own 
political reputation as well as that of their party.4 
In this paper, we offer a first account of presidential activism in the electoral arena of 
European democracies. We focus on the electoral performance of the prime minister, because 
                                               
4
 The literature on semi-presidential democracies refers to situations in which presidents have 
an alliance to the government as unified government and situations in which the president’s 
party is not in government as cohabitation. However, this terminology is not used in studies 
of parliamentary democracies. For this reason we choose a terminology that applies equally 
in semi-presidential and parliamentary democracies and refer to governments as allied or not 
allied to the president. 

































































of its central and privileged importance in the process of democratic electoral accountability. 
Prime ministers have primary political and administrative responsibility for the decisions of 
their governments and voters focus predominantly on the prime minister’s party in holding 
the government to account for its achievements and failures in office (Anderson, 2000; Duch 
& Stevenson, 2013, 2015; Lewis Beck, 1997).5 Presidents with significant control over early 
election calling, we argue, affect this pivotal accountability relationship. They can condition 
the timing of elections and pick the circumstances of the voters’ reckoning to benefit their 
political allies. As a result prime ministers, whose cabinets have the support of a president 
with significant dissolution power, can be expected to outperform their peers who lack such 
political ties.6 We test this argument using data on 190 elections in eighteen European 
democracies. Our results reveal that presidents with at least intermediate dissolution powers 
significantly affect election outcomes. Prime ministers whose governments are allied to such 
presidents realize a vote and seat share bonus of around five percentage points.7  
                                               
5
 In semi-presidential democracies during periods of unified government, the prime minister’s 
party is of course also the presidential party. 
6
 While we focus on the influence that presidents exert on the electoral performance of prime 
ministers, our study also lays the foundations for further work on presidential influence in 
legislative elections. Most notably, our results raise the question how presidents may be able 
to affect the electoral performance of their own party (whether in or out of government) and 
their party’s closest competitors. Our work thereby opens up a wider research agenda 
concerning the effects of presidential activism in the electoral arena. 
7
 To reiterate, we do not propose that governments become more popular when early 
elections are called. Our argument is that a president’s influence on election timing allows 
incumbents allied to the president to benefit electorally because the elections are 
systematically timed to circumstances that favor the incumbent. 

































































These results have implications for three important areas in comparative politics. To 
the literature on presidential activism in parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies, 
our study contributes a better appreciation of the political consequences of presidential 
assembly dissolution powers, which opens up a new research agenda, focusing on 
presidential activism in the electoral arena. Our work also has relevance for the extensive 
literature on strategic election timing by incumbents. By highlighting the assembly 
dissolution powers of presidents and their electoral consequences, our findings suggest that 
presidential influence is likely to be a central and omitted factor in this literature’s accounts 
of election timing in parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies. Finally, our work has 
implications for studies of electoral accountability because it suggests that presidents with 
significant dissolution powers may be able to moderate the accountability of prime ministers 
for political failure and their ability to reap the fruits of good performance.  
 
Elections and incumbent popularity  
A well-established literature in political science argues that the electoral support of 
incumbents is critically shaped by government performance (Key 1966, Fiorina 1981, Powell 
2000). The majority of these studies focus on accountability for economic outcomes (Fiorina, 
1981; Nannestad & Paldam, 1994; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000; Powell, 2000). The 
central finding of this work is that voters are performance oriented: When the economy is 
performing well, they reward the government, when economic performance is poor, they vote 
against the incumbent. The link between economic conditions and the electoral support of 
incumbents is well documented in studies that use survey data and in work that employs 
objective economic indicators (Duch & Stevenson, 2008;  Kayser & Peress, 2012; Nadeau et 
al., 2012). There is also evidence that performance voting extends beyond economic voting to 
other aspects of government performance (Hobolt et al., 2013, Klašnja et al., 2016), and that 

































































it applies in semi-presidential democracies, even when the two parts of the dual executive - 
government and the presidency - are controlled by different parties or party coalitions. Lewis-
Beck (1997), for instance, finds that in France, cohabitation (i.e., control of the government 
and the presidency by opposing parties or party coalitions) reinforces, rather than weakens, 
the public perception that accountability for the national economy lies with the government. 
Hellwig & Samuels (2008) confirm this finding in a comparative context.  
In addition, voter perceptions of the incumbent’s competence can be influenced by the 
governing parties’ performance in winning control of other positions of power in a political 
system, as the literature on presidential coattails makes clear (Golder, 2006; Stoll, 2015). 
Legislative elections do not take place in a vacuum, and parties that field popular and 
successful candidates in direct elections for the presidency are typically perceived as more 
competent by voters than their less successful peers. This tends to benefit their performance 
in the legislative elections, particularly when the two elections are held in close temporal 
proximity (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, pp. 146-150). When the elections are held further apart 
in time, intervening events reduce the probability that a governing party’s performance in the 
parliamentary elections will benefit from its success in the presidential race.  
One implication of these findings is that politicians with influence on election timing 
may prefer to call elections when the popularity of governments that they support is high, 
rather than at random times. That is, the timing of elections is likely to be consequential 
because incumbents do better at the polls when they look most competent. This raises two 
questions, (i) whether election timing is used to influence in which context elections are held 
and (ii) whether parliamentary dissolution powers confer a partisan advantage on those in 
whom they have been vested. 
The political economy literature on opportunistic election timing addresses the first of 
these questions – whether elections are timed to influence in which context the poll is held. 

































































Building on the observation that election dates in parliamentary democracies are not fixed, 
this literature assumes that governments themselves control election calling and examines 
how far incumbents time election to circumstances that favour them, a strategy referred to as 
“political surfing” (Chowdhury, 1993; Ito, 1990; Ito & Park, 1988; Palmer & Whitten, 2000). 
This research uncovers evidence of political surfing in different contexts. For example, Ito 
and Park (1988) show that Japanese elections are timed to coincide with favourable economic 
shocks, Chowdhury (1993) finds that economic growth influences Indian election timing, and 
Voia and Ferris (2013) document that business cycle peaks predict election calls in Canada. 
Cross-national evidence, however, is less consistent. Although several studies document 
political surfing in comparative work (Palmer & Whitten, 2000; Schleiter & Tavits, 2016), 
others find no evidence of it (Alesina & Roubini, 1992; Alesina, Cohen & Roubini, 1993). 
There are also theoretical reasons to anticipate that many governments are unable to surf. 
Recent studies show that only a minority of European constitutions grant incumbent 
governments and prime ministers sole discretion to dissolve (Strøm & Swindle, 2002; 
Goplerud & Schleiter, 2016). A central assumption of the opportunistic election timing 
literature – that the power to time early elections generally lies with the incumbent 
government – is therefore often mistaken. 
Indeed, as Strøm and Swindle (2002, p. 576) observe, most contemporary European 
constitutions which permit parliamentary dissolution “place the ultimate decision in the hands 
of the head of state … [and i]n some cases, France and Italy among them, the head of state is 
constitutionally free to dissolve parliament at his or her discretion.” More commonly, 
however, the president has a more limited role in initiating, advancing or taking the final 
decision in a dissolution process that also involves other political actors. Several studies 
suggest that presidents use these powers in a politically consequential manner. Schleiter and 
Morgan-Jones (2009) show that presidential dissolution powers affect early government 

































































terminations. According to Fernandes and Magalhaes (2015), presidents with full 
constitutional discretion to dissolve parliament precipitate early elections more frequently 
than their peers without such powers in semi-presidential democracies. Less powerful 
presidents, who are only able to veto parliamentary dissolution, too, exercise their 
prerogatives and limit early election calling by incumbent governments (Strøm and Swindle,  
2002, p. 589). These studies provide compelling evidence that presidential dissolution powers 
affect government terminations and the frequency of early elections, which raises the obvious 
question whether presidents realize a partisan advantage for prime ministers to whom they 
are allied by using these powers. To date, there are no comparative studies that examine the 
electoral consequences of the presidential use of dissolution powers. In this paper, we provide 
the first such analysis and significantly advance the understanding of presidential activism. 
 
Presidents, assembly dissolution, and the electoral success of prime ministers  
Studies of presidential activism suggest that the impact of presidential preferences on 
political outcomes is conditioned by institutional rules (Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006; Tavits, 
2009). The consensus in this literature is that presidential goals affect outcomes when a 
president has the constitutional powers to pursue them. That is, presidents with the political 
motivation to influence election timing can be expected to do so only when they have 
significant constitutional powers to dissolve parliament and not otherwise. An adequate 
understanding of presidential influence on dissolution therefore requires attention to a 
president’s political preferences and constitutional powers. We discuss each of these factors 
in turn. 
Presidents can be expected to prefer that governments to which they are allied face 
elections when conditions are favorable. As politicians, European presidential heads of state, 
whether directly or indirectly elected, must work with governments dependent on legislative 

































































support in pursuing their political goals (Duverger, 1980; Shugart & Carey, 1992; Elgie, 
1999; Strøm & Swindle, 2002; Tavits 2009). Moreover, in most of Europe’s democracies 
with presidential heads of state, single party majorities are rare. Presidential parties therefore 
hardly ever govern on their own, but participate in government as part of a coalition. For 
presidents, a parliamentary election that rewards a government to which they are allied, i.e., a 
government in which their party controls the premiership or is a coalition partner, has 
multiple benefits. It may enable the presidential party to hold on to office, which can afford 
presidents influence on government formation and may even allow them to hand-pick 
individual ministers (Protsyk, 2005; Tavits 2009). A good election result can also 
significantly shape the dynamics of policy making to the president's advantage. It may align 
the cabinet’s policy preferences with the president’s, reducing the potential for conflict and 
delays in policymaking and assist presidents in realizing their policy goals (Ward, 1994; 
Urbanavicius, 1999; Morris, 1994). Thus, legislative elections that benefit a president’s 
political allies make a successful working relationship between the president and the 
government more likely. This not only helps presidents to build their personal reputation as 
effective politicians, but a successful period in office can also contribute to legitimizing the 
institution of the presidency itself (McMenamin, 2008). In sum, presidents whose allies are in 
government are more likely to be successful in influencing government formation, promoting 
their policy goals, building their political reputation and the legitimacy of their office. As a 
result, presidents can be expected to prefer that legislative elections occur under conditions 
that favour the incumbent when their political allies are in government, but not otherwise. 
However, not all presidents have the constitutional powers to achieve this goal. 
Several studies document that presidential powers to influence parliamentary dissolution and 
election timing vary extensively in European constitutions (Shugart & Carey, 1992; Metcalf, 
2000; Strøm & Swindle, 2002). Dissolution processes are often complex. They may involve 

































































multiple steps and conditions, can be subject to temporal constraints (e.g., dissolution may 
not be permitted within a specified time period before or after assembly or presidential 
elections), and may engage a range of political actors. Recent studies differ in their 
conceptualization and measurement of a president's influence on the dissolution process. 
Strøm and Swindle (2002), for instance, distinguish between powerless heads of state, 
presidents with prerogatives to veto parliamentary dissolution and presidents who can 
dissolve parliament unilaterally. The most comprehensive attempt to measure presidential 
influence on parliamentary dissolution constructs a 10-point scale that records presidential 
powers to (i) initiate the dissolution process, (ii) advance it and (iii) decide parliamentary 
dissolution, taking account of the political and temporal constraints that constitutions may 
impose on the use of these powers (Goplerud & Schleiter, 2016). Constitutional dissolution 
powers give presidents the means to influence election calling: Presidents with greater 
constitutional influence on parliamentary dissolution can be expected to have more extensive 
opportunities to shape election timing than their peers with weaker powers.  
There are several reasons to anticipate that presidents can improve the re-election 
prospects of their political allies by using their assembly dissolution powers. An extensive 
literature consistently finds that voters reward incumbents whose policies are performing well 
(see Nadeau et al., 2012 for a recent review; see also Duch & Stevenson, 2008; Lewis-Beck 
& Stegmaier, 2000; Nannenstad & Paldam, 1994). Voters have also been shown to reward 
incumbents (and other parties) that demonstrate competence in other electoral races, most 
notably the race for a popularly elected presidency (Samuels & Shugart, 2010). A 
government’s chances of re-election are improved if early elections can be held to coincide 
with favourable conditions such as a peak in economic performance, good results in other 
policy areas, or success in a presidential race. Delaying the poll to the next regular election 
date gives rise to risks, because a government’s popularity advantage is never guaranteed and 

































































may be eroded by an unforeseen downturn in performance, policy shocks or scandals. For 
popular incumbents, then, a president's willingness to acquiesce in premature elections can 
make the difference between a government's ability to profit electorally from a peak in its 
popularity and its inability to do so. In crises too, governments stand to benefit from 
presidential support. As the French early election of 1968 illustrates, even in the context of 
severe crisis, early elections may still benefit the incumbents if their popularity remains high 
enough to make electoral victory likely. Whether or not presidents enable access to early 
elections for such governments can therefore make a crucial difference to the incumbent's 
ability to reassert control of the situation and to hold on to power. Thus presidents who use 
their election calling powers are likely to be able to improve the electoral prospects of their 
political allies in government. 
In sum, we anticipate that presidents with extensive influence on assembly dissolution 
use early elections to promote the electoral fortunes of their allies. Prime ministers whose 
governments are allied to such presidents should therefore face elections under systematically 
more favourable conditions than (i) prime ministers who lack a political alliance with a 
powerful president and (ii) prime ministers who work with presidents that lack significant 
influence on dissolution.8 These expectations are summarized in the following hypothesis:  
 
                                               
8
 Note, that this argument applies to the electoral performance of prime ministers in early as 
well as regular elections: Incumbents who can access to early elections with presidential 
support under favourable conditions are by definition less likely to face regular elections once 
their popularity advantage has been eroded. Conversely, incumbents who are confident of 
their ability to perform well in regular elections are more likely to be able to complete their 
full term if have the support of a president with extensive dissolution powers.   

































































Prime ministers on average outperform their peers electorally when they (i) lead a 
government that is allied to a president and (ii) the president has extensive 
constitutional powers to influence election calling, but not otherwise. 
 
Empirical strategy 
A potential challenge in testing our hypothesis is that the same underlying conditions which 
lead to a government’s alliance with the president may also affect the electoral performance 
of the prime minister. For instance, as noted above, it is likely that parties, which capture the 
presidency because they are competent and therefore popular, also perform well in 
parliamentary elections. The empirical task, therefore, is to distinguish the effect of 
presidential dissolution powers from the benefit that PM parties may derive from their 
underlying competence and popularity. 
Our research design enables us to address this concern about the endogeneity of an 
alliance to the president and PM electoral success by focusing on the difference between two 
conditional effects, i.e., the effect on the incumbent PM's electoral performance of an alliance 
to the president at high and low levels of presidential dissolution powers. The difference 
between these conditional effects can be estimated without bias if the potential source of 
endogeneity between an alliance to the president and the electoral performance of the PM 
(i.e., the underlying competence and popularity of the parties) is equally present in settings in 
which the president has high and low assembly dissolution powers. Under this assumption, 
the conditional effect of an alliance to a president at each level of presidential assembly 
dissolution power is independent of the potential source of endogeneity (see Rajan & 
Zingales, 1998, and Frye, 2010 for a similar approach). 
The competence and popularity of any particular party is unlikely to be systematically 
correlated with the level of presidential assembly dissolution power for two reasons. First, 

































































constitutional dissolution regimes were typically forged as part of a wider constitutional 
settlement in moments of crisis, revolution, regime collapse, defeat in war, or independence 
(Elster 1995, p. 371). These critical junctures were characterized by a high level of 
uncertainty about the effects of institutional rules given the rapidly changing political context. 
Against this background attempts to choose institutions that maximized the interests of 
particular parties were generally unsuccessful. For example, Andrews and Jackman (2005, p. 
65) find with respect to East Central Europe that extreme uncertainty prevented party leaders 
“from making choices that served their self-interest.”9 Instead, constitutional settlements were 
frequently informed by a historically contingent understanding of how best to secure 
democracy,10 and negotiated in forums such as constituent assemblies, that required 
consensus among a wide range of actors, precisely to ensure that the settlement did not 
systematically reflect the interests of any specific party.  
 Second, both West and East European constitutions are entrenched in order to 
forestall change by any particular popular party for its own benefit. In practice, entrenchment 
requires the support of broad coalitions to realize constitutional change in the form of super-
majorities and even cross temporal coalitions (when intervening elections are required for a 
constitutional change to take effect). As a result changes to the rules of parliamentary 
dissolution, like other constitutional changes, require a level of cross-partisan support that 
forestalls a systematic correlation between the electoral popularity of any particular party and 
                                               
9
  See also Ginsburg, Elkins and Blount (2009) who find no evidence that legislatures 
produce constitutions with more parliamentary power than do constituent assemblies. 
10
 For instance, the broad consensus regarding the need to constrain the executive’s powers to 
dissolve parliament in the German Basic Law after World War II was powerfully shaped by 
the misuse of parliamentary dissolution during the crisis of the Weimar Republic (Shugart & 
Carey, 1992 pp. 148-166). 

































































the level of presidential dissolution power. In sum, high and low levels of presidential 
assembly dissolution powers can plausibly be conceived as independent of a PM party’s 
underlying popularity and competence. This makes it possible to estimate the difference 
between the conditional effect of an alliance to the president at each level of presidential 
assembly dissolution power without bias. 
Our empirical analysis now proceeds in two steps: We begin with a simple unadjusted 
difference-of-means test comparing the electoral performance of PM parties who are and are 
not allied to presidents with strong and weak influence on the parliamentary dissolution. We 
then turn to a controlled comparative analysis contrasting the two conditional effects of 
interest, i.e., the effect on a PM’s electoral performance of being allied to a president with 
extensive, rather than restricted influence on dissolution. Although the first part of the 
analysis does not take account of confounding influences, it sheds some valuable preliminary 
light on our theory. If our hypothesis is true, PMs who are allied to a president with 
significant influence on election timing should on average perform better electorally than 
their peers who lack such an alliance or who are allied to a president that lacks influence on 
election timing. If the anticipated effect is evident in unadjusted difference-of-means tests 
and in more complex, controlled comparative analyses, we can be more confident that it is 
not an artefact of post-hoc statistical adjustments and modelling choices. 
 
Data and variables  
To test our hypothesis we construct an original dataset covering 190 elections in 18 European 
democracies with presidential heads of state from 1945, or democratization, to June 2013.11 
The data are organized as country-election panels.  
                                               
11
 The democracies included are Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, 

































































Throughout, we employ two alternative measures of our dependent variable, PM 
electoral performance: the vote share and the seat share of the PM party in elections to the 
lower (or sole) house of parliament (information about all variables and data sources is 
available in appendix 1). 
Our first explanatory variable records whether or not the president is allied to the 
government. To capture the political relationship of the president with the government we 
record whether the president’s party is in government either as the PM's party or as a 
coalition partner (alliance to president). In instances in which presidents lack party affiliation 
and cabinets are technical, we record that the presidential party is not represented in 
government.12 To measure our second explanatory variable – presidential dissolution powers 
– we draw on the index of presidential dissolution power developed by Goplerud and 
Schleiter (2016).  The index records the constitutional (i.e., de jure) powers of presidents to 
                                                                                                                                                  
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Since we focus on European democracies with presidential 
heads of state, our data do not include constitutional monarchies. This shapes the baseline 
category for comparison. In monarchies, the power to dissolve parliament typically lies with 
the prime minister, whereas republics usually constrain the discretion of the head of 
government. Hence, if the president is not empowered to dissolve parliament in a republic, 
the path to dissolution is typically constrained. 
12
 We also implement an alternative coding for non-party presidents who were elected with 
the support of the governing party or coalition. It is possible to view these presidents as allied 
to the government by virtue of their electoral alliance and despite their non-party status. 
Additionally, we explore the implications of dropping technical cabinets from the analysis 
rather than treating them as equivalent to cases in which the presidential party is excluded 
from government. Our findings are robust to these specifications (see robustness checks 
below). 

































































bring about the pre-term dissolution of the parliament. It is anchored at one end at a minimum 
value of 0, denoting presidents who have no influence on dissolution (i.e., Slovenia) and at 
the other end by a maximum value of 10, which records the complete discretion of a 
president to dissolve the parliament (i.e., Finland 1919). To this maximum value, the index 
applies penalties for different types of constraints on a president's ability to call pre-term 
elections, including (i) constraints on the president's agenda setting role in initiating and 
advancing the dissolution process,13 (ii) constraints on the ability to trigger dissolution,14 (iii) 
time-related constraints on early election calling, for example a ban on dissolution for part of 
the parliamentary or presidential term, and (iv) the conditionality of a president's ability to 
initiate, advance or decide dissolution on the binding consent or non-binding consultation of 
one (or more) further actors. The penalties are applied multiplicatively to the maximum score 
of 10 for each president. When a constitution foresees multiple paths to dissolution, the index 
focusses on the maximum score for a president across any of the paths available to them on 
the assumption that presidents will use the dissolution path that they can most easily 
influence (scores reported in appendix 2).  
 
Analysis 
To examine how presidents shape the electoral fate of prime ministers, we begin with simple 
difference-of-means tests. Recall that we expect cabinets which are allied to presidents with 
extensive dissolution powers to outperform their peers electorally on average. For the 
purposes of this analysis we dichotomize presidential dissolution powers and distinguish 
                                               
13
 A president may, for instance, have the power to initiate a dissolution process (potentially 
subject to the agreement of further actors) only after a no-confidence vote in the government. 
14
 For example, a president may have discretion to trigger an early election only upon the 
request of the prime minister. 

































































between presidents with significant and weak influence on the calling of parliamentary 
elections. We categorize presidents as strong if they have a dissolution powers score of at 
least 5 (the mid-point of the 0 – 10 scale); weak presidents are categorized as those with a 
dissolution power score smaller than 5. For both categories of presidential power, table 1 
reports the mean vote and seat share of the PM's party when the government is, and is not, 
allied to the president together with difference-of-means tests.  
The upper half of the table focusses on presidents with strong dissolution powers and 
shows that incumbents who are allied to the president perform better than their peers who 
lack an alliance to the president: the vote share bonus for the PM’s party is around 9 
percentage points, the seat share bonus is 10 per cent. These differences are large and 
statistically significant (p-value = 0.00). The lower half of the table focusses on presidents 
with weak influence on parliamentary dissolution and suggests that the allies of these 
presidents do not fare any better than their peers who lack such an alliance – in fact, the mean 
vote and seat shares suggest that they fare slightly worse than their peers, although the 
difference-of-means tests do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. These 
patterns are consistent with our hypothesis. Presidential allies on average outperform their 
peers in elections when presidents can exert significant influence on the timing of the polls 
and not otherwise.15 
                                               
15
 As noted above, we include regular and early elections in the analysis, because prime 
ministers who are allied to a president with extensive dissolution powers can be expected to 
outperform their peers in both types of elections. Evidence that this expectation is borne out 
by the data is available in SI 2. 












































































Strong president (dissolution powers >= 5) 
  
PM vote share 59 27.84 77 36.65 8.81 0.00 
PM seat share 59 30.56 77 40.70 10.14 0.00 
Weak president (dissolution powers < 5) 
   
PM vote share 33 25.76 20 24.95 -0.81 0.81 
PM seat share 33 26.60 20 26.08 -0.52 0.89 
Note: PM denotes prime minister. Missing data on party affiliation reduces the number of observations to 189. 
 
While these differences are suggestive, testing our hypothesis requires that we 
contrast the two conditional effects of interest – the effect on a government's electoral 
performance of being allied to a president with strong as opposed to weak influence over 
legislative dissolution – in a multivariate regression framework, taking account of 
confounding factors, which may influence a PMs electoral success. These confounding 
factors include a PM's vote and seat share in the previous election (the lagged dependent 
variable) because parties with an extensive electoral base, which win large vote and seat 
shares in one election are likely to remain large in the next election (PM vote share (lagged), 
PM seat share (lagged)). We also take account of any potential effects of semi-
presidentialism (i.e., direct presidential elections). Semi-presidentialism may depress a PM’s 
electoral performance when a conflict between a governing party’s legislative and 
presidential electoral mandates engenders inefficiencies in the government’s policy process 
(Samuels & Shugart, 2010). To control for the potential coattail effects of direct presidential 
elections, we include a measure of the presidential election’s proximity to the parliamentary 
election (Proximity to pres. election, 1 = presidential election held within 180 days before or 
after the legislative election, otherwise 0),16 and its interaction with direct presidential 
                                               
16
 This operationalization reflects Stoll’s (2015) finding that presidential elections held before 
and after legislative elections have coattail effects. 

































































elections (SP*Proximity to pres. election). Presidential coattails may benefit or hinder the 
governing party or coalition depending on the performance of its candidate in direct 
presidential elections. Economic performance has been shown to affect the electoral 
performance of incumbent PMs and we control for the effect of GDP growth (annual) 6 
months lagged. Finally, the policy challenges faced by governments vary significantly over 
time. To account for this changing context, which affects the electoral success of 
governments, we include decade indicators in the analysis. 17   
To contrast the effect on a government's electoral performance of being allied to a 
president with strong as opposed to weak influence over legislative dissolution, we split our 
observations into cases observed under high and low levels of presidential dissolution power, 
using the mid-point (5) of the 10-point presidential dissolution powers scale, as above.18 The 
two dependent variables – the PM party's vote share (models 1 and 2) and seat share (models 
3 and 4) – are modeled using OLS regression, with country-clustered standard errors. The 
results are nearly identical when these models are specified as multilevel regressions with 
country-level random intercepts (analysis available in table SI 3). 
Table 2 reports the results and shows that governments, which are allied to a president 
with strong influence on parliamentary dissolution, achieve vote and seat share bonuses of 
just over five per cent compared to their peers who do not have political ties with the 
president. PMs allied to weaker presidents fail to realize a significant electoral advantage. 
                                               
17
 We examine the robustness of this model’s results to a series of alternative specifications 
and to the addition of a wide range of additional controls (see discussion of robustness 
below). 
18
 Below we present an additional analysis that pools the data and examines the conditional 
effect of an alliance to the president on a PM’s electoral performance across the full range of 
presidential dissolution powers. 

































































These results lend support our hypothesis and are consistent with the descriptive evidence 
reported in table 1: Only extensive parliamentary dissolution powers appear to enable 
presidents to influence election timing for the benefit of their political allies. 
 
 
Table 2: PM Electoral Success (OLS regression) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 









Alliance to president 2.21 5.14*** 3.33 5.14*** 
 (3.48) (1.22) (4.56) (1.51) 
PM vote share (lagged) 0.31* 0.70***   
 (0.17) (0.07)   
PM seat share (lagged)   0.30 0.61*** 
   (0.27) (0.13) 
Semi-presidentialism -11.16** -0.64 -9.19 0.07 
 (4.23) (1.81) (8.04) (2.74) 
Proximity pres. election -1.77 3.57 -3.23 7.82 
 (3.66) (3.01) (3.68) (7.59) 
SP*Prox. pres. election 8.81 -0.16 15.80* -3.60 
 (5.68) (3.68) (7.89) (7.97) 
Growth (annual) 6m lagged 0.01 0.24 0.03 0.25 
 (0.48) (0.23) (0.68) (0.33) 
Constant 19.67*** 1.06 18.43 2.94 
 (5.74) (2.13) (11.45) (3.69) 
Decade dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 52 118 52 118 
R-squared 0.50 0.63 0.38 0.56 
Note: Weak president denotes a dissolution power score smaller than 5, strong presidents have dissolution 
power scores of 5 or larger, SP denotes semi-presidentialism. Table entries are regression coefficients with 
robust, country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
  
  
 All control variables have the anticipated effects. PMs who lead parties that were 
large in the previous election (in terms of vote or seat share) are likely to continue to perform 
better electorally than their peers who lead smaller parties. Semi-presidentialism tends to 
have a negative sign, but the effect is most often not precisely estimated. Presidential 
coattails, which can both help or harm the electoral fortunes of the PM’s party depending on 
the performance of its presidential candidate, have no consistent effect overall. Growth is 

































































always positively signed, which indicates that it tends to benefit the electoral performance of 
the incumbent PM, but this effect falls short of conventional levels of statistical significance.
 To shed further light on the conditional effect of an alliance to the president at all 
levels of presidential dissolution power, we pool the data across the full range of dissolution 
powers and analyze the electoral performance of PMs in a single (rather than a split-sample) 
model, which includes the interaction of presidential dissolution powers (measured on the 10-
point scale) and alliance to the president (Alliance to pres.*Pres. diss. power), the two 
constitutive terms of the interaction and all of the control variables in the main models that 
we present in table 2. As before, we estimate this model for both of our dependent variables, 
PM vote and seat share (results reported in table 3, appendix 3). Based on this analysis, figure 
1 plots the marginal effect of a cabinet’s alliance to the president on a PM’s electoral 
performance, across the full range of variation in presidential dissolution power. Panel 1 
focusses on the PM party's vote share, panel 2 on its seat share. Both panels show that the 
effect of leading a cabinet that is allied to the president is strongly positive and statistically 
significant only at high levels of presidential dissolution power, as anticipated. This effect 
weakens as presidential powers diminish and becomes negative (though not statistically 
significant) at very low levels of presidential dissolution power, when an alliance with the 
president simply represents the inclusion of an additional party in the cabinet. This matches 
the expectations summarized in our hypothesis precisely. An examination of the conditional 
effect of presidential dissolution powers yields equivalent results: Increasing the 
constitutional assembly dissolution power of a president from its minimum value, 0, to its 
maximum of 10 significantly raises the predicted vote share of a PM only when the cabinet is 
allied to the president (by 7 per cent, from 28 per cent to 35 per cent). Absent an alliance to 
the president, the same increase in presidential dissolution power leaves the PM party’s 
predicted vote share essentially unaltered at around 28 per cent. 



































































Figure 1: Marginal Effect of Alliance to President across the Full Range of Presidential 
Dissolution Powers 
 
Note: The figure displays the marginal effect of leading a cabinet that is allied to the president (with 95% 
confidence intervals) on a PM's electoral performance in terms of vote share (panel 1) and seat share (panel 2) 
while varying presidential dissolution power. Semi-presidentialism and proximity to presidential election are 
held constant at their mode, other control variables at their mean. 
 
 


































































To assess the robustness of these results, we proceed in five steps. First, we omit the decade 
indicators to establish that the results of our main models (cf. table 2) do not change 
substantially and are not driven by the temporal trend (table SI 4).  
 Second, we examine how far the basic effect that we uncover is robust to the 
addition of a broad range of further controls (singly and jointly). These controls include 
additional measures of economic performance (inflation 6 months lagged, unemployment 6 
months lagged), single party government, which may facilitate government co-operation with 
the president, majoritarian electoral system, which may correlate with greater vote and seat 
shares for the incumbent PM, parliamentary fragmentation (effective number of parties), 
which may reduce the PM’s seat and vote share, PM dissolution power, which may give 
incumbent PMs a degree of direct influence the timing of elections, other presidential 
powers, which captures additional legislative or cabinet-related constitutional powers of 
presidents that may influence the performance and therefore the electoral fate of the 
government, and the age of democracy, because older democracies tend to have less volatile 
electorates, which may increase the vote and seat share of incumbent PMs (tables SI 5-8). 
 Third, we address alternative ways of coding technical governments and some non-
party presidents. It is possible to disagree about the coding of cases in which the president co-
exists with a government that is technical or largely non-partisan. Some of the literature on 
cabinet formation sees these cabinets as indicative of the ability of prime ministers to shape 
ministerial selection independently of his or her party’s preferences (Costa Lobo, 2005). 
However, other work attributes the appointment of such governments to presidential 
influence (Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006; Tavits, 2009). We address this concern by 
performing an additional analysis in which we drop these ambiguous cases from the sample 
instead of coding them as cases in which the government is not allied to the president, and re-

































































estimate our main models (cf. table 2; results available in table SI 9). Additionally, different 
coding decisions can reasonably be applied to a small group of non-party presidents, who 
were elected with the support of the governing party or coalition, and may therefore have the 
interest of that government at heart. These presidents can plausibly be viewed as allied to the 
government by virtue of their electoral alliance, even though they have no party affiliation. 
We implement this alternative coding in table SI 10 and re-run the main models presented in 
our paper (cf. table 2). 
Fourth, we restrict the definition of cabinets allied to the president to include only 
those cases in which the PM shares the president's party affiliation (i.e., excluding cases in 
which the presidential party is a minor coalition partner in government), and estimate our 
main models again (cf. table 2; results available in table SI 11).  
Our main finding is robust across all of these alternative specifications: PMs who lead 
cabinets that are allied to a president with significant constitutional influence on assembly 
dissolution realize a sizable incumbency advantage (measured in terms of votes and seats). 
Fifth, we examine the plausibility of two alternatives to the account that we propose 
and explore whether presidents affect the electoral performance of PMs, not because of their 
dissolution powers, but because of their other constitutional powers or the presidential mode 
of election, which make them consequential political actors in the political system with a 
strong motivation to assert themselves. We re-estimate our interacted model (cf. table 3, 
appendix 3) to test these expectations. Table SI 12 explores whether cabinets that are allied to 
presidents with constitutional powers other than the power of assembly dissolution fare better 
electorally than those PMs who have no such alliance (figure SI 1 presents the corresponding 
marginal effects). Table SI 13 probes whether cabinets that are allied to popularly elected 
presidents fare better electorally than their peers without such an alliance (figure SI 2 reports 
the corresponding marginal effects). Both of these additional tests yield null results. 

































































Taken together, these results suggest that European presidents with significant 
influence on parliamentary dissolution (i.e., those with a dissolution powers score of 5 or 
more) affect legislative election outcomes. Constitutional powers over parliamentary 
dissolution give presidents the opportunity to influence the timing elections for the benefit 
their allies in government, for instance by enabling them to take advantage of waves of public 
support and periods of strong economic performance. PMs who are supported by presidents 
invested with such powers realize an average incumbency advantage of around five per cent 
in terms of vote and seat share.  
These findings do not imply that presidents can always use their influence on early 
election calling to the advantage of their allies in any government. Timing an early election is 
a decision fraught with uncertainty, which carries the risk that the president's allies might be 
defeated. Miscalculation is always possible as the French President Jaques Chirac discovered 
in 1997, when he called an early assembly election designed to aid his allies – the right-wing 
cabinet under Prime Minister Alain Juppé – that resulted in Juppé’s defeat (Hainsworth, 
1998). As this example illustrates, not all governments are able to achieve sufficiently strong 
policy performance and a large enough public opinion poll lead to benefit from strategic 
election timing by the president. Both electoral uncertainty and underlying differences in 




This paper offers the first account of how European presidential heads of state influence 
election calling and the electoral performance of PMs. Presidents with significant 
constitutional powers to influence election timing can condition the timing and circumstances 
of the voters’ reckoning to the benefit of their political allies. We show that the resulting 

































































average electoral advantage for PMs who are allied to a powerful president is sizable and 
amounts to around five per cent of the parliamentary votes. In many instances, this bonus is 
larger than the average vote share margin by which parliamentary elections are won in the 
countries that we study. 
These findings have implications for three areas of importance in comparative 
politics. First, they contribute to a fuller understanding of the political importance of 
presidential dissolution powers in the growing literature on presidential activism. While much 
of this work has focused on presidential influence in relation to government formation, 
composition and termination, we take a first step in mapping how presidents use their 
assembly dissolution powers to affect parliamentary election results. 
Second, our paper lays the foundations for a better and more accurate understanding 
of the institution of flexible election timing in parliamentary democracies and complements 
the extensive political economy literature on opportunistic election calling. A shared 
assumption in that literature is that discretion to dissolve the assembly invariably lies in the 
hands of incumbent governments in parliamentary democracies. This assumption, we show, 
is often mistaken. Instead, parliamentary democracies with presidential heads of state 
typically give these actors a role in the momentous decision to dissolve the assembly. 
Presidential powers to dissolve parliament and presidents’ political motivations are therefore 
likely to be important omitted variables in comparative work that seeks to account for the 
timing of early elections in parliamentary democracies. 
Third, our study opens up new ways of thinking about the electoral accountability of 
incumbent governments in European democracies. Our finding that presidents condition the 
electoral success of their allies in government suggests that they may be able to moderate the 
strength of the economic vote and accountability for other aspects of government 
performance.  Presidential dissolution powers have remained unexplored in the literature on 

































































performance voting, but they give presidents the opportunity to influence under which 
conditions governments are held accountable by voters, which is likely to shape the outcome 
of electoral accountability. The political consequences of presidential powers to call early 
elections, then, may be comparable to those of clarity of responsibility, which the extant 
literature sees as a main mediating factor that conditions the strength of the economic vote 
and electoral accountability in general (Powell & Whitten, 1993; Anderson, 2000; Hobolt et 
al., 2013). 
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Government data  Schleiter & Morgan-Jones (2009), augmented using Andersson, Bergman & Ersson (2012), The European 
Representative Democracy Data Archive (www.erdda.se); Keesings; EJPR and country specific sources. 
 
Alliance to president Based on government data and presidential party affiliation, recorded by the authors using Keesings; EJPR and 
country specific sources; LexisNexis. 
 
PM party vote share,  
PM party seat share 
Parliamentary Democracy Data Archive; Andersson, Bergman & Ersson (2012). The European Representative 
Democracy Data Archive (www.erdda.se); augmented using http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/countries.html 
as well as country specific sources. 
 
Presidential dissolution powers Goplerud & Schleiter (2016). 
 
GDP growth Annual data. Maddison Project Database. Bolt & van Zanden (2013). The First Update of the Maddison Project; 




International Constitutional Law Project (http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/) as well as country specific sources. 
Proximity to presidential 
election 
 
Presidential and parliamentary election dates from Schleiter and Morgan-Jones (2009), augmented using 
Keesings; EJPR; LexisNexis and country specific sources. 
Supplementary Information (Robustness Checks) 
 
Inflation (6m lagged) Annual data. Eurostat, OECD. 
 
Unemployment (6m lagged) Annual data.  OECD Annual Labor Force Statistics, augmented using  Labour Statistics Yearbooks, and 
unemployment data series of the World Bank and IMF (World Economic Outlook). 
 






















































Single party government Indicator (1, otherwise=0). Based on sources of government data. 
 
Majoritarian electoral system Indicator (1, otherwise=0). Bormann & Golder (2013).  
 
Effective number of parties Gallagher & Mitchell (2008), augmented using Golder (2005) and calculations by the authors. 
 
PM dissolution power Goplerud & Schleiter (2016). 
 
Other presidential powers Total legislative and cabinet-related presidential powers score minus dissolution powers as recorded by Shugart & 
Carey (1992). Sources: Shugart and Carey (1992), augmented using Fortin (2013); missing cases were coded by 
the authors including Germany, Italy, Greece (1975, 1986), and Finland (1995, 1999).  
 
Age of democracy Polity IV Project, polity2 score, http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm. 






















































Appendix 2: Presidential Dissolution Powers 
 
Country Presidential Dissolution Powers 
Austria 10 
Czech Republic (1992) 3.17 
Czech Republic (2009) 3.17 
Estonia 5 
Finland (1919) 10 
Finland (1991) 4.75 
France (1958) 9.03 
Germany 2.50 
Greece (1975) 9.50 
Greece (1986) 2.50 
Hungary (1989) 2.48 






Poland (1989) 5.23 
Poland (1992) 5.23 
Poland (1997) 4.75 
Portugal (1976) 9.50 
Portugal (1982) 8.10 
Romania 2.02 
Slovakia (1992) 2.38 
Slovakia (1999) 3.09 
Slovenia 0 
      Data source: Goplerud and Schleiter (2016). 
  

































































Appendix 3: Interacted Model 
 
The analysis reported in table 3 sheds further light on the interaction between presidential 
dissolution powers and an alliance to the president in our main models (cf. table 2, main 
paper). Instead of splitting the sample into governments that work with presidents who have 
greater or lesser influence on election calling, this analysis pools cases at all levels of 
presidential dissolution power and includes the interaction between presidential dissolution 
power and a cabinet's status as allied to the president, as well as all constitutive terms of the 
interaction as explanatory variables. Table 3 reports the regression results. Figure 1 (main 
paper) presents the corresponding marginal effects plots visualizing the interactive effects. As 
anticipated, the plots show that PMs only reap an electoral advantage when they are allied to 
a president with extensive dissolution powers. 

































































Table 3: PM electoral success (pooled model with interaction term, OLS regression) 
 (1) (2) 
 PM vote share PM seat share 
Presidential dissolution power -0.16 0.23 
 (0.34) (0.44) 
Alliance to president -2.32 -0.31 
 (2.93) (3.45) 
Alliance to pres.*Pres. diss. power 0.93** 0.67 
 (0.34) (0.42) 
PM vote share (lagged) 0.66***  
 (0.08)  
PM seat share (lagged)  0.56*** 
  (0.13) 
Semi-presidentialism -3.40 -2.33 
 (2.00) (2.78) 
Proximity to presidential election -0.58 1.16 
 (3.00) (5.25) 
SP*Proximity to pres. election 5.16 5.91 
 (3.36) (5.69) 
Growth (annual) 6m lagged 0.08 0.05 
 (0.24) (0.36) 
Constant 6.21* 5.47 
 (3.21) (4.76) 
Decade dummies Yes Yes 
N 170 170 
R-squared 0.57 0.49 
Note: SP denotes semi-presidentialism. Table entries are regression coefficients; country-clustered standard 
errors in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.  








































































This section provides additional evidence to probe the realism of our main theoretical 
expectation  that presidents make use of their dissolution powers to promote the electoral 
fortunes of their political allies in government. We proceed in two steps. First, we examine 
whether presidents actually make use their constitutional dissolution powers by presenting 
differenceofmeans tests of the frequency of early elections under presidents with extensive 
assembly dissolution powers compared to presidents who lack such powers. Second, we 
expand on the anecdotal examples given in the introduction to the main paper by reviewing 
the case oriented literature, which extensively documents the strategic use of parliamentary 
dissolution by presidents for partisan political benefit. 
Do presidents who are endowed with extensive constitutional influence on 
parliamentary dissolution make use of that influence to call or permit early elections? In table 
SI 1 below, we use our data to examine this question. The table shows that early elections are 
more frequent under presidents with extensive dissolution powers than under their 
constitutionally weaker peers. When presidents have strong assembly dissolution powers 
(dissolution powers >=5), early elections account for 45 per cent of all elections, whereas 
political systems in which presidents have only weak influence on assembly dissolution 
feature a significantly lower frequency of early elections of just 28 per cent (value = 0.03).
 
















54 0.28 136 0.45 0.17 0.03 
 

































































How far, then, are these early elections used strategically by presidents to promote the 
electoral interests of their political allies as our theoretical discussion in the main paper 
suggests? The case oriented secondary literature provides extensive anecdotal evidence, 
which speaks to this question. It documents that European presidents employ their dissolution 
powers to (i) advantage governing parties allied to the president, (ii) disadvantage governing 
parties that oppose the president, and (iii) promote the electoral interests of the presidential 
party. We review these three strategic uses of presidential dissolution powers in turn.  
Studies by country experts give numerous examples of presidential choices to permit 






. For instance, 
the Irish constitution gives the president discretion in responding to prime ministerial requests 
for dissolution when the government that has “ceased to retain the support of a majority” 
(Article 13.2.2).
1
  This discretion enables presidents to veto early elections if the president 
concludes that the prime minister retains the support of the assembly. Irish presidents can 
therefore impose political restrictions on the prime minister’s ability to call early elections. In 
1944, president Hyde (Fianna Fáil) established a precedent by using this discretion for 
partisan advantage when, after a defeat on a minor issue, his copartisan, prime minister de 
Valera requested a dissolution. President and prime minister agreed that this was situation, in 
which the president could have refused dissolution, but president Hyde agreed to the preterm 
dissolution and de Valera was returned to office (Gallagher, 1999, p.108). Subsequent Fianna 
Fáil presidents have typically followed this precedent and granted their copartisans’ requests 
to call early elections. This has been to the electoral advantage of Fianna Fáil premiers: Prime 
                                                
1
 As Gallagher (1999, p. 108) notes, the article “does not elaborate on precisely how the 
question of whether the Taoiseach has ceased to retain the support of the Dáil is to be tested, 
nor does it spell out when and why a president might decide to refuse a dissolution to such a 
Taoiseach.”  

































































ministers Lemass (in 1961), Lynch (1969) and Haughey (1989) were all given access to early 
elections by a copartisan Fianna Fáil president, which successfully secured their return to 
office (Gallagher, 1999; Mitchell, 2000). Italian presidents, who are constitutionally 
empowered to call early elections unilaterally, have equally allowed their copartisan prime 
ministers to go to the polls early when it was electorally opportune (Verzichelli, 2003, pp.
45657). President Giovanni Leone (a Christian Democrat), for instance, permitted early 
elections after the collapse of governments lead by Christian Democratic Prime Ministers 
Andreotti in 1972 and Moro in 1975. In both instances, the Christian Democratic Party 
returned to government and continued to hold the premiership (Verzichelli, 2000, p. 455). 
The Finnish president Kekkonen used the power of assembly dissolution in 1962, 1972 and 
1975 (Arter, 1999, p. 58; Nousiainen,  2000, pp. 290291) to harness “the three main parties 
of the centreleft (the Communist, Social Democrats and Centre) into a durable Presidential 
majorité” (Arter, 1981, p. 221). In 1962, the election call enabled his party to convert a single 
party minority government into a majority coalition government, and the early election of 
1972 resolved a deadlock within the presidential coalition over incomes policy (Arter, 1981, 
p. 230, Nousiainen, 2000, pp. 290291). French presidents have also made extensive use of 
strategic election calling for partisan benefit in 1962, 1968, 1981 and 1997. The 1962 and 
1968 elections enabled the Gaullists and their allies to win parliamentary majorities 
supporting the president. In 1981, parliamentary dissolution by President Mitterrand (a 
Socialist) secured control of the assembly by his party, three years after its electoral defeat in 
the previous legislative elections.  Only President Chirac miscalculated when he called early 
elections in 1997, as a result of which the parties composing the presidential majority lost 
control of the government (Thiébault, 2000). This case based evidence is consistent with our 
expectation that presidents employ their assembly dissolution powers for partisan gain so that 
prime ministers who are allied to such presidents fare better on average in elections, than 
their peers who lack such an alliance. 





































































    	
. For example, the 
Portuguese president Sampaio (a Socialist) dissolved parliament in 2004, toppling a centre
right coalition led by prime minister Santana Lopes, which had become increasingly 
unpopular. This gave the president’s Socialist Party the opportunity to capitalize on the 
popularity of its new leader, José Sócrates. In the elections that followed, the prime minister’s 
party sustained heavy electoral losses while the Socialists secured an absolute majority in 
parliament (Magone, 2005, 2006). A president’s refusal to dissolve parliament in 
circumstances that would favour the opposition can be similarly damaging: In 1994, for 
instance, Italy’s President Scalfaro (at the time a member of the centreleft PPI party, a 
successor to the Christian Democrats that later merged into the party La Margherita) refused 
a request for parliamentary dissolution by the rightwing prime minister Berlusconi. As 
Grimaldi (2011, p. 112) notes, “[t]his crisis was particularly severe because of the vehemence 
of the outgoing Prime Minister, who placed considerable pressure on the head of state to 
dissolve the legislature that had begun just 7 months earlier” (see also Pasquino, 1999, pp. 
4078). In contrast, president Scalfaro did agree to early elections just two years later, in 
1996, when a successful alliance of centreleft parties led the cabinet (Verzichelli, 2000, p. 
464). The Irish president, too, has used the dissolution power to prevent the opposition from 
accessing early elections. In November 1994, following the failure of a Fianna Fáilled 
coalition government, President Robinson, who had been a member of the Labour Party 
before becoming president, sought legal advice regarding her constitutional power to refuse a 
request for a dissolution, if one were made.
2
 “The Taoiseach [prime minister], accordingly, 
resigned but did not seek a dissolution, which paved the way for the first ever change of 
government without an election, as the Labour party linked up with two former opposition 
parties to form a new coalition” (Gallagher, 1999, pp. 117118). This case based evidence 




, 21 Oct. 1997. 

































































suggests that the theoretical expectation underpinning our analysis accurately reflects the 
observations of country experts: Premiers who lead governments that are not allied to a 
president with extensive assembly dissolution powers can be expected to fare worse 
electorally than their peers who benefit from such an alliance. 
Finally, the case oriented literature documents the strategic use of presidential 




instance, in 1985, seven months before the end of the Portuguese president Eanes’s second 
term in office, the coalition government led by the socialist prime minister Soares collapsed. 
For Eanes, who decided to enter parliamentary politics though the PRD, a new party that he 
had created, the unpopularity of the governing Socialist Party created an opportunity. Eanes 
seized the opportunity and called early elections against the express wish of the prime 
minister. In the ensuing legislative race the president’s new party, PRD, won as much as 17 
per cent of the votes (Costa Lobo, 2001, pp. 190192). In a similar manner, the Polish 
president Wałęsa attempted to take advantage of the 1993 defeat of Suckocka’s coalition 
government and called early elections in order to shore up his parliamentary support. He 
hoped that his newly formed presidential alliance grouping, the BBWR (a nonparty reform 
block), would profit from a change in the electoral law, which reduced the degree of 
proportionality and favoured larger parties and groupings. In the event, however, this 
strategic dissolution backfired and the new block only won sixteen seats providing Wałęsa 
with minimal parliamentary support (van der Meer KrokPaszkowska, 1999, pp. 182183). 
The Latvian president Zatlers initiated parliamentary dissolution with similar goals, albeit in 
a more restrictive constitutional context. Article 48 of the Latvian constitution enables the 
president to propose early elections, which then requires ratification by a national 
referendum.
3
 Zatlers made use of this option in 2011, when it became clear that the major 
parliamentary parties were not prepared to support his campaign to win reelection to the 
                                                
3
 If the referendum fails, the president is removed from office. 

































































presidency. Exploiting the unpopularity of his parliamentary opponents, Zatlers instigated a 
referendum to secure the dissolution of parliament, which was endorsed with over 94 per cent 
of the votes cast. He then contested the ensuing 2011 parliamentary elections with the newly 
founded Zatlers Reform Party, which secured 22 per cent of the parliamentary seats and 
entered the next coalition government (Ikstens, 2012).  
In sum, the evidence provided by the case oriented literature suggests that our main 
theoretical expectation is realistic: European presidents use their parliamentary dissolution 
powers for the benefit of their political allies, precisely as the theory developed in the main 
text suggests. 








































































Prime ministers who are allied to a president with extensive dissolution powers can be 
expected to outperform their peers in 		 and 	 elections for two reasons. First, 
incumbents who can access to early elections with presidential support under favourable 
conditions are by definition less likely to face regular elections once their popularity 
advantage has been eroded. Second, incumbents who are confident of their ability to perform 
well in regular elections are more likely to be able to complete their full term if they benefit 
from an alliance to a president with extensive dissolution powers. Table SI 2 below tests this 
expectation. As anticipated, presidential allies outperform their peers in early and regular 
elections when presidents can exert significant influence on the timing of the polls.   
 
 











Restricted sample, early elections  
Strong president (dissolution powers >= 5)  
PM vote share 25 25.90 36 38.10 12.20 0.00 
PM seat share 25 28.92 36 41.91 12.99 0.00 
Weak president (dissolution powers < 5)   
PM vote share 11 26.56 3 35.47 8.90 0.12 
PM seat share 11 30.22 3 35.70 5.47 0.38 
Restricted sample, regular elections  
Strong president (dissolution powers >= 5)  
PM vote share 32 29.11 35 36.82 7.71 0.00 
PM seat share 32 31.59 35 41.11 9.52 0.00 
Weak president (dissolution powers < 5)   
PM vote share 22 25.35 17 23.09 2.26 0.54 
PM seat share 22 24.78 17 24.38 0.40 0.92 
PM denotes prime minister. Eight elections are classified as technical, i.e. triggered by the death of a PM 
or other nonpolitical event and therefore count neither as called early for political reasons nor as regular. 
Missing data on party affiliation reduces the number of observations to 181. 





































































Table SI 3 replicates our main analysis (cf. table 2, main paper), using a multilevel model 
with random, countrylevel intercepts and reports maximum likelihood estimates of the 
regression coefficients as well as the variance components.  
 
Table SI 3: PM electoral success (multilevel random intercept model) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 














 (2.77) (1.56) (3.64) (1.87) 




   
 (0.14) (0.06)   











 (3.30) (1.61) (4.66) (1.94) 
Proximity to pres. election 1.77 3.57 3.23 7.82
**
 
 (3.70) (2.61) (4.98) (3.12) 
SP*Prox. to pres. election 8.81 0.16 15.80
*
 3.60 
 (6.39) (4.11) (8.71) (4.90) 
Growth (annual) 6m lagged 0.01 0.24 0.03 0.25 






 (5.29) (2.95) (7.33) (3.52) 
Decade dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Variance components     
Country level 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 










 (0.81) (0.48) (1.10) (0.57) 
 52 118 52 118 
: Weak president denotes a dissolution power score smaller than 5, strong presidents have dissolution 
power scores of 5 or larger, SP denotes semipresidentialism. Table entries are regression coefficients; standard 
errors in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
 
 
The results are virtually identical to those reported in the main paper – while PMs who are 
politically allied to a president with strong dissolution powers are able to realize a vote and 
seat share bonus of just over five percent, those who are allied to presidents with weaker 

































































dissolution powers enjoy no such benefits. Note that only the governmentlevel variance 
component is always statistically significant, suggesting that there is not sufficient variance in 
the data at the country level to support a multilevel modelling approach.  
 









































































First, we omit the decade indicators to establish that the results of our main models (cf. table 
2) do not change substantially and are not driven by the temporal trend. Table SI 4 reports the 
results of the reestimation dropping the decade dummies, which indicate that our main 
conclusion is robust. Only governments allied to presidents with extensive dissolution powers 
realize vote and seat share bonuses. The magnitude of these bonuses is estimated at around 
5.5 percentage points, slightly larger than in our main models. The variance explained 
changes only very slightly.  
 
Table SI 4: PM electoral success (no decade indicators, OLS regression) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 














 (2.76) (1.48) (3.71) (1.77) 




   
 (0.15) (0.07)   
PM Seat Share (lagged)   0.32 0.64
***
 
   (0.25) (0.12) 
Semipresidentialism 11.02
**
 0.41 8.83 0.32 
 (3.41) (2.03) (7.06) (2.98) 
Proximity to pres. election 1.86 3.45 3.75 8.34 
 (3.96) (3.44) (4.04) (7.65) 
SP*Prox. to pres. election 8.26 0.29 15.57
*
 3.31 
 (5.74) (4.22) (7.72) (7.97) 
Growth (annual) 6m lagged 0.08 0.35 0.02 0.39 
 (0.43) (0.21) (0.65) (0.27) 
Constant 19.67
***
 2.70 18.41 5.55 
 (5.71) (2.07) (11.61) (4.38) 
 52 118 52 118 
Rsquared 0.49 0.60 0.38 0.50 
Note: Weak president denotes a dissolution power score smaller than 5, strong presidents have dissolution 
power scores of 5 or larger, SP denotes semipresidentialism. Table entries are regression coefficients with 
country clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 





































































Second, tables SI 5 to SI 8 examine how far our results (cf. table 2, main paper) are robust to 
the addition of a broad range of further control variables (both singly and jointly). The 
additional controls include supplementary aspects of economic performance (

 
     ), s
 	 	, which may 
facilitate government cooperation with the president, 	
	
	 , which 
may correlate with greater vote and seat shares for the incumbent PM, parliamentary 
fragmentation (
		
), which may reduce the PM’s seat and vote share, 
 ! 

 	, which may give incumbent PMs a degree of direct influence the 
timing of elections, 	 	

 	 which captures additional legislative or 
cabinetrelated constitutional powers of presidents that may influence the performance and 
therefore the electoral fate of the government (based on Shugart & Carey’s (1992) 
presidential powers index), and the   	, because older democracies tend to 
have less volatile electorates, which may increase the vote and seat share of incumbent PMs. 
Tables SI 5 and 6 report the results focussing on PM  	 as the dependent 
variable, while tables SI 7 and 8 focus on PM 	. To facilitate the presentation of the 
results, we group the additional control variables so that tables SI 5 and 7 report the results 
for the inclusion of variables that never have a statistically significant effect on either 
dependent variable, while tables SI 6 and 8 focus on variables that reach statistical 
significance in some of the models. Our central conclusion is robust in all of these additional 
analyses. 

































































Table SI 5: PM electoral success – vote share (additional controls, OLS regression) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Dependent variable: PM vote share 
 Weak President Strong President 









 (3.62) (3.44) (3.48) (3.58) (1.05) (1.28) (1.44) (1.39) 
























 0.44 0.69 0.56 0.35 
 (4.51) (4.31) (4.23) (4.60) (1.50) (1.78) (1.96) (1.76) 
Proximity to pres. election 3.74 1.78 1.77 3.75 2.95 3.50 3.66 2.90 
 (6.71) (3.73) (3.66) (6.78) (3.35) (3.18) (3.29) (3.74) 
SP*Prox. to pres. election 11.10 8.83 8.81 11.13 1.16 0.07 0.23 0.98 
 (8.10) (5.73) (5.68) (8.10) (4.05) (3.93) (3.83) (4.42) 
Growth (annual) 6m lagged 0.16 0.01 0.01 0.16 0.09 0.24 0.24 0.06 
 (0.66) (0.49) (0.48) (0.67) (0.27) (0.22) (0.24) (0.27) 
Inflation 6m lagged 0.04   0.04 0.17   0.19 
 (0.08)   (0.08) (0.20)   (0.21) 
Single party government  0.09  0.11  0.31  0.88 
  (3.69)  (3.91)  (1.91)  (1.65) 
Majoritarian electoral system   0.00 0.00   0.56 1.02 









 4.29 1.17 1.13 4.98 
 (8.49) (5.72) (5.74) (8.61) (3.78) (2.31) (2.28) (4.49) 
Decade dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 52 52 52 52 108 118 118 108 
Rsquared 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 
: Weak president denotes a dissolution power score smaller than 5, strong presidents have dissolution power scores of 5 or larger, SP denotes semipresidentialism. Table 
entries are regression coefficients with robust, countryclustered standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 






















































Table SI 6: PM electoral success – vote share (additional controls, OLS regression) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
    Dependent variable: PM vote share     
 Weak President Strong President 













 (3.44) (2.77) (3.15) (3.59) (3.25) (2.88) (1.18) (1.19) (1.16) (1.18) (1.04) (1.21) 






































 0.54 0.61 0.83 1.00 0.01 0.79 
 (4.34) (3.06) (4.39) (4.04) (4.41) (3.95) (1.90) (1.78) (1.90) (1.83) (2.37) (2.77) 
Proximity pres. election 0.33 1.14 0.29 4.00 0.46 1.21 3.53 3.37 3.78 3.37 3.96 3.61 
 (3.93) (3.65) (4.19) (3.98) (4.35) (4.65) (2.98) (2.96) (3.03) (3.08) (2.65) (2.71) 
SP*Prox. pres. election  7.11 5.96 7.00 11.17
*
 6.48 5.27 0.07 1.64 0.29 0.04 0.40 1.25 
 (5.78) (5.80) (5.94) (6.00) (6.08) (5.95) (3.65) (3.54) (3.72) (3.71) (3.58) (3.37) 
Growth 6m lagged 0.04 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.14 0.25 0.23 0.13 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.04 
 (0.49) (0.40) (0.48) (0.46) (0.50) (0.45) (0.26) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) (0.23) 
Age of democracy 0.07     0.05
**
 0.01     0.10
*
 
 (0.05)     (0.02) (0.04)     (0.05) 
Unemp. 6m lagged  0.86
**
    0.74
*
  0.20    0.50 
  (0.29)    (0.37)  (0.25)    (0.30) 
PM dissolution power   1.32
**
   0.37   0.14   0.33 
   (0.50)   (0.97)   (0.14)   (0.27) 
Effective n. of parties    2.44
**
  1.71    0.89  0.59 
    (0.78)  (1.33)    (0.68)  (0.52) 



















 (5.30) (6.62) (4.84) (7.59) (7.13) (10.97) (1.84) (4.39) (2.18) (4.87) (2.36) (6.46) 
Decade dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 52 52 52 52 52 52 118 114 118 118 118 114 
Rsquared 0.51 0.58 0.54 0.54 0.51 0.61 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.66 
: Weak president denotes a dissolution power score smaller than 5, strong presidents have dissolution power scores of 5 or larger, SP denotes semipresidentialism. Table 
entries are regression coefficients with robust, countryclustered standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 






















































Table SI 7: PM electoral success – seat share (additional controls, OLS regression) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Dependent variable: PM seat share 
 Weak President Strong President 









 (4.64) (4.51) (4.56) (4.59) (1.60) (1.48) (1.69) (1.83) 









 (0.30) (0.24) (0.27) (0.27) (0.15) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) 
Semipresidentialism 9.34 9.12 9.19 9.27 0.49 0.06 0.04 0.27 
 (8.43) (8.14) (8.04) (8.54) (2.43) (2.69) (2.87) (2.58) 
Proximity to pres. election 5.52 3.40 3.23 5.71 7.26 7.46 7.77 6.59 
 (6.42) (3.90) (3.68) (6.54) (8.07) (7.94) (7.70) (8.56) 








 4.83 3.15 3.55 3.99 
 (9.36) (7.89) (7.89) (9.25) (8.36) (8.41) (8.04) (9.01) 
Growth (annual) 6m lagged 0.20 0.04 0.03 0.21 0.01 0.24 0.25 0.05 
 (0.90) (0.69) (0.68) (0.91) (0.42) (0.33) (0.34) (0.39) 
Inflation 6m lagged 0.05   0.05 0.09   0.10 
 (0.09)   (0.09) (0.18)   (0.19) 
Single party government  1.58  1.62  1.44  2.19 
  (4.03)  (4.13)  (3.23)  (3.15) 
Majoritarian electoral system   0.00 0.00   0.24 0.50 
   (.) (.)   (1.98) (2.28) 
Constant 14.93 19.03 18.43 15.52 6.57 3.47 2.97 7.70 
 (13.92) (11.19) (11.45) (13.87) (4.77) (3.76) (3.59) (4.89) 
Decade dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 52 52 52 52 108 118 118 108 
Rsquared 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.57 
Weak president denotes a dissolution power score smaller than 5, strong presidents have dissolution power scores of 5 or larger, SP denotes semipresidentialism. Table 
entries are regression coefficients with robust, countryclustered standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1






















































Table SI 8: PM electoral success – seat share (additional controls, OLS regression) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
   Dependent variable: PM seat share    
 Weak President Strong President 













 (4.50) (3.75) (4.34) (4.90) (4.14) (3.72) (1.53) (1.40) (1.52) (1.21) (1.52) (1.43) 
PM seat share (lagged) 0.30 0.40
*















 (0.25) (0.20) (0.25) (0.28) (0.25) (0.26) (0.12) (0.16) (0.14) (0.21) (0.13) (0.20) 
Semipresidentialism 10.34 5.31 11.84 10.42 10.59 5.53 1.16 0.16 0.07 0.20 0.24 1.82 
 (7.82) (5.65) (8.38) (8.13) (8.17) (6.56) (2.69) (2.39) (2.93) (2.41) (2.84) (2.59) 
Prox. pres. election 1.16 2.72 1.25 5.31 1.39 2.82 7.40 7.37 7.83 7.17 7.91 6.91 
 (3.60) (4.76) (4.00) (3.72) (4.05) (5.25) (7.53) (7.48) (7.84) (6.99) (7.64) (6.83) 
SP*Prox. pres. election 13.33 11.50 14.11 18.60
**
 12.33 9.29 2.72 5.08 3.60 3.18 3.66 4.14 
 (7.66) (7.70) (8.07) (8.09) (8.13) (7.74) (7.83) (7.81) (8.16) (7.49) (8.01) (7.18) 
Growth 6m lagged 0.07 0.18 0.12 0.07 0.22 0.36 0.15 0.03 0.25 0.27 0.25 0.10 
 (0.68) (0.55) (0.68) (0.68) (0.70) (0.59) (0.35) (0.35) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.39) 
Age of democracy 0.11     0.12
***
 0.06     0.13
*
 
 (0.06)     (0.03) (0.04)     (0.07) 
Unemp. 6m lagged  1.42
***
    1.51
**
  0.45    0.60 
  (0.32)    (0.49)  (0.35)    (0.41) 
PM dissolution power   1.31
**
   1.74   0.01   0.43 
   (0.46)   (1.41)   (0.21)   (0.29) 
Effective n. of parties    2.45
**
  2.20    1.74  1.25 
    (1.08)  (2.27)    (1.46)  (1.31) 
Other pres. powers     1.51 1.75     0.21 0.57 
     (1.00) (1.29)     (0.47) (0.51) 
Constant 16.95 29.45
***
 16.14 2.25 22.99 22.34 4.99 9.58 2.95 15.89 3.69 26.56
**
 
 (10.62) (7.97) (10.16) (13.65) (12.65) (16.30) (3.36) (7.02) (3.70) (11.68) (3.63) (11.90) 
Decade dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 52 52 52 52 52 52 118 114 118 118 118 114 
Rsquared 0.40 0.52 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.56 0.59 
Weak president denotes a dissolution power score smaller than 5, strong presidents have dissolution power scores of 5 or larger, SP denotes semipresidentialism. Table 
entries are regression coefficients with robust, countryclustered standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 


























































Third, it is possible to disagree about the treatment of cases in which the president coexists 
with a technical and largely nonparty government, and about the coding of some of the cases 
in which the president is a nonpartisan. We discuss both groups of cases in turn.  
Some of the literature on cabinet formation sees technical and largely nonparty 
cabinets as indicative of the ability of prime ministers to shape ministerial selection 
independently of his or her party’s preferences (Costa Lobo, 2005). However, other work 
attributes the appointment of such governments to presidential influence (Amorim Neto & 
Strøm, 2006; Tavits, 2009). It might therefore not be appropriate to treat these governments 
as equivalent to partisan governments that do not include the president’s party. For this 
reason we perform an additional analysis in which we drop these cases from the sample, 
instead of coding them as cases in which the government is not allied to the president, and re
estimate our main models (cf. table 2). The results are reported in table SI 9 and indicate that 
our main conclusions are robust in this reduced sample. 
In addition it is possible to disagree about the appropriate coding of some cases in 
which the president has no party affiliation. Our main approach to coding nonparty 
presidents is to record them as not affiliated with the cabinet. To the extent that some non
party presidents are elected with the support of the governing party or coalition, however, 
they may have the interest of that government at heart. Treating these presidents none the less 
as nonpartisans is a conservative strategy that should make it more difficult to find support 
for our hypothesis. Alternatively nonparty presidents who were elected with the support of 
the governing party or coalition can be coded as allied to the government by virtue of their 
electoral alliance, despite the fact that they lack a party affiliation. We implement this 
alternative coding in Table SI 10 and rerun the main models presented in our paper (cf. table 
2). The results indicate that our findings are robust to this alternative way of coding nonparty 
presidents.  


































































Table SI 9: PM electoral success (reduced sample excluding technical governments, OLS 
regression) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 














 (3.50) (1.12) (4.61) (1.50) 
PM Vote Share (lagged) 0.25 0.69
***
   
 (0.20) (0.09)   
PM Seat Share (lagged)   0.24 0.58
***
 
   (0.29) (0.15) 
Semipresidentialism 11.16
**
 0.64 9.29 0.16 
 (4.25) (1.92) (8.10) (2.94) 
Proximity to pres. election 1.88 3.45 3.44 7.53 
 (3.56) (3.03) (3.51) (7.56) 
SP*Prox. to pres. election 8.90 0.03 15.76
*
 3.32 
 (5.73) (3.72) (8.03) (8.01) 
Growth (annual) 6m lagged 0.02 0.23 0.05 0.23 
 (0.48) (0.22) (0.68) (0.33) 
Constant 22.53
**
 1.89 21.53 4.64 
 (7.39) (2.82) (12.88) (4.91) 
Decade dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 51 116 51 116 
Rsquared 0.46 0.57 0.35 0.49 
Weak president denotes a dissolution power score smaller than 5, strong presidents have dissolution 
power scores of 5 or larger, SP denotes semipresidentialism. Table entries are regression coefficients with 
robust, countryclustered standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 



































































Table SI 10: PM electoral success (coding nonparty presidents elected with the support of 
governing parties as allied to the cabinet, OLS regression) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 














 (3.05) (1.27) (3.89) (1.60) 
PM Vote Share (lagged) 0.24 0.70
***
   
 (0.16) (0.07)   
PM Seat Share (lagged)   0.23 0.60
***
 
   (0.26) (0.14) 
Semipresidentialism 11.62
**
 0.64 9.81 0.09 
 (4.15) (1.83) (7.94) (2.76) 
Proximity to pres. election 1.58 3.64 3.20 7.88 
 (3.63) (3.02) (3.83) (7.57) 
SP*Prox. to pres. election 7.17 1.04 13.39
*
 4.47 
 (4.80) (3.57) (7.03) (7.94) 
Growth (annual) 6m lagged 0.06 0.25 0.06 0.26 
 (0.45) (0.23) (0.64) (0.33) 
Constant 20.97
***
 1.11 19.74 3.04 
 (5.70) (2.13) (11.46) (3.72) 
Decade dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 52 118 52 118 
Rsquared 0.52 0.63 0.41 0.56 
Note: Weak president denotes a dissolution power score smaller than 5, strong presidents have dissolution 
power scores of 5 or larger, SP denotes semipresidentialism. Table entries are regression coefficients with 
country clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 





































































Fourth, table SI 11 examines whether our results are robust if we narrow the 
conceptualization of an alliance to a president only to those cabinets in which the PM shares 
the president's party affiliation. A reestimation of our main models (cf. table 2, main paper) 
using this narrowed definition indicates that our central finding is robust: PMs who share the 
party affiliation of strong presidents perform better electorally than their peers who are allied 
to weaker presidents.
 
Table SI 11: PM electoral success (narrowed conception of alliance to president, OLS 
regression) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 














 (3.09) (1.72) (4.00) (1.49) 
PM vote share (lagged) 0.29 0.72
***
   
 (0.17) (0.08)   
PM seat share (lagged)   0.29 0.62
***
 
   (0.26) (0.13) 
Semipresidentialism 11.44
**
 0.25 9.27 0.43 
 (4.24) (2.13) (8.06) (3.01) 
Proximity to pres. election 1.26 3.11 2.66 7.38 
 (3.90) (3.38) (3.85) (8.06) 
SP*Prox. to pres. election 8.48 1.09 15.19
*
 2.50 
 (5.55) (4.46) (7.71) (8.63) 
Growth (annual) 6m lagged 0.03 0.32 0.06 0.32 
 (0.49) (0.24) (0.69) (0.34) 
Constant 20.27
***
 2.13 18.72 4.21 
 (5.87) (2.27) (11.65) (3.92) 
Decade dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 52 118 52 118 
Rsquared 0.50 0.61 0.39 0.54 
Weak president denotes a dissolution power score smaller than 5, strong presidents have dissolution 
power scores of 5 or larger, SP denotes semipresidentialism. Table entries are regression coefficients with 
robust, countryclustered standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 





































































Fifth, we examine the plausibility of two alternatives to the account that we propose. These 




	, but because of their other constitutional powers or the 
presidential mode of election, which make them consequential political actors in the political 
system with a strong motivation to assert themselves. We reestimate our interacted model 




Table SI 12: PM electoral success and other presidential powers (pooled model, OLS 
regression) 
 (1) (2) 
 PM vote share PM seat share 
Other presidential powers 1.13
***
 0.53 
 (0.34) (0.41) 
Alliance to president 1.98 4.70
*
 
 (2.31) (2.44) 
Alliance to pres.*Other pres. powers 0.16 0.71 
 (0.80) (0.71) 
Presidential dissolution power 0.44 0.66 
 (0.41) (0.42) 
PM vote share (lagged) 0.62
***
  
 (0.09)  
PM seat share (lagged)  0.53
***
 
  (0.13) 
Semipresidentialism 3.15 2.26 
 (2.15) (2.83) 
Proximity to presidential election 0.16 1.60 
 (3.13) (5.39) 
SP*Proximity to presidential election 3.97 5.07 
 (3.55) (5.89) 
Growth (annual) 6m lagged 0.09 0.08 




 (3.67) (5.33) 
Decade dummies Yes Yes 
 170 170 
Rsquared 0.58 0.50 
Note: SP denotes semipresidentialism. Table entries are regression coefficients with countryclustered standard 
errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 







































































fare better electorally than those PMs who have 
no such alliance (Figure SI 1 presents the corresponding marginal effects). 
 
 







: The figure displays the marginal effect of leading a cabinet that is allied to the president (with 95% 
confidence intervals) on a PM’s electoral performance in terms of vote share (panel 1) and seat share (panel 2) 
while varying presidential powers other than the power of assembly dissolution. Semipresidentialism is held 
constant at its mode, other control variables at their mean. 
 
Table SI 13 probes whether cabinets that are allied to 	 presidents fare better 
electorally than their peers without such an alliance (see Figure SI 2 for the corresponding 
marginal effects). The results of these additional analyses indicate that neither of the 
alternative causal mechanisms accounts for our results: PMs who lead governments that are 
allied to a popularly elected president or a president with extensive powers other than 

































































parliamentary dissolution powers				 than their peers who are allied 
to indirectly elected or constitutionally weaker presidents. 
 
 
Table SI 13: PM electoral success and popular presidential election (pooled model, OLS 
regression) 
 (1) (2) 
 PM vote share PM seat share 
Semipresidentialism (SP) 2.99 1.02 
 (2.40) (3.57) 
Alliance to president*SP 0.77 2.24 
 (2.83) (4.20) 





 (2.28) (2.90) 
Alliance to president*SP*Proximity 3.43 11.80 
 (5.96) (9.33) 





 (2.57) (4.07) 
Alliance to president 4.29
*
 4.90 
 (2.40) (3.34) 





 (1.72) (2.62) 
Presidential dissolution power 0.34 0.63 
 (0.40) (0.45) 
PM vote share (lagged) 0.63
***
  
 (0.09)  
PM seat share (lagged)  0.55
***
 
  (0.13) 
Growth (annual) 6m lagged 0.07 0.04 
 (0.26) (0.38) 
Constant 4.15 3.28 
 (3.58) (5.45) 
Decade dummies Yes Yes 
 170 170 
Rsquared 0.57 0.49 
: SP denotes semipresidentialism. Table entries are regression coefficients with countryclustered standard 
errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Semipresidentialism (i.e., the direct election of the 
president) is not only interacted with alliance to the president, but also with the temporal distance between 
presidential and parliamentary elections to account for presidential coattails. For this reason, we control for the 
threeway interaction between alliance to the president, direct election, and the temporal proximity of 
presidential and parliamentary interactions, as well as all constituent terms of this interaction. 
 

































































Figure SI 2: Marginal effect of alliance to 	 president 
 
 
: The figure displays the marginal effect of leading a cabinet that is allied to a popularly elected president 
(with 95% confidence intervals) on a PM’s electoral performance in terms of vote share (panel 1) and seat share 
(panel 2). Because direct presidential election is also interacted with the proximity of the legislative election to 
the presidential election in order to take account of potential presidential coattails, both panels display the effect 
of direct presidential election while varying the proximity between presidential and parliamentary elections from 
greater than 180 days (Prox. to Pres. Election <= 180 days = 0) to within 180 days (Prox to Pres. Election <= 
180 days = 1). Semipresidentialism is held constant at its mode, other control variables at their mean.
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